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Abstract 
,QGLYLGXDOVKDYHYDULRXVNLQGVRIREOLJDWLRQVNHHSSURPLVHVGRQ¶WFDXVHKDUPUHWXUQEHQHILWV
received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy, and so on. How does this work 
for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same 
NLQGVRIREOLJDWLRQVDVLQGLYLGXDOV7KHVHFRQGLVZKHWKHUJURXSV¶pro tanto obligations plug into 
what they all-things-FRQVLGHUHGRXJKWWRGRWRWKHVDPHGHJUHHWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶pro tanto 
obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both 
counts. 
 
Keywords 
Collective obligation, collective responsibility, individual obligation, group agency, 
demandingness, promises, wrongdoing, benefit, beneficence, associative obligation 
 
Introduction 
Individuals have obligations to perform various kinds of actions: keep promises (Owens 2006; 
Shiffrin 2008), avoid causing harm (Pogge 2002), return benefits received as a result of injustice 
(Butt 2007), be reasonably partial to their nearest and dearest (Scheffler 1997), help those in need 
(Goodin 1985), rectify past harms (Thompson 2006), and so on.1 But how does each kind of 
obligation work for group agents? In particular, do they work the same way for group agents as 
                                                 
1
 :HXVHµREOLJDWLRQV¶DQGµGXWLHV¶LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\WRPHDQWKLQJVWKDWprima facie ought to be done. See §III for the 
move from prima facie to all-things-FRQVLGHUHGGXWLHVRUREOLJDWLRQV(DFKµNLQG¶RIGXW\ OLVWHGKHUHJLYHVULVH WR
particular duties to perform particular acts in particular circumstances. In different terminology, kinds of duties can 
be understood as sources of normative responsibility, which give rise to requirements to perform particular actions in 
particular contexts (for one way of cashing out the details, see Björnsson and Brülde forthcoming). 
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for individual agents? There are two interrelated issues here. The first is whether groups can bear 
all the kinds of obligation listed above²and, more generally, whether groups can bear 
obligations-to-act of the same kinds as individuals. This is the issue of groXSREOLJDWLRQV¶scope. 
7KDW LV WKH VFRSH RI JURXSV¶ REOLJDWLRQV-to-act: we leave aside obligations-to-think and 
obligations-to-feel.) 7KH VHFRQG LVVXH LV ZKHWKHU JURXSV¶ pro tanto obligations plug into what 
they all-things-considered ought to do to the sDPHGHJUHHWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶pro tanto obligations 
plug into what they all-things-FRQVLGHUHGRXJKW WRGR7KLV WKHTXHVWLRQRIJURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQV¶
strength. 
7KHREYLRXVDQVZHUPLJKWVHHPWREHWKDWJURXSV¶DQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶REOLJDWLRQVDUHRQD
par in these respects. Moral obligations bear on moral agents; some groups are moral agents; 
WKHUHIRUHPRUDOREOLJDWLRQVEHDURQVRPHJURXSV,IWKDW¶VULJKWWKHQWKHTXHVWLRQVDUHQ¶WZKHWKHU
all the same kinds of obligations bear, and bear with the same strength, on groups as on 
LQGLYLGXDOV7KHDQVZHUWRERWKTXHVWLRQVLVµ\HV¶5DWKHUWKHLPSRUWDQWTXHVWLRQLVWKHIDPLOLDU
one of which groups count as moral agents (on that question, see e.g. Held 1970; French 1984; 
Pettit 2007). But parity is in fact not obvious at all. 
One reason parity is not obvious is that group agents are set up in order to pursue their 
KXPDQ FUHDWRUV¶ RU PHPEHUV¶ HQGV ZKHUHDV PRVW SHRSOH ZKR KDYH FKLOGUHQ H[SHFW WKHP WR
GHYHORSHQGVRI WKHLURZQ ,I WKHUH¶V DQ\WKLQJJURXSDJHQWVRXJKW WRGR VXUHO\ LW¶V OLPLWHG WR
ZKDWWKH\ZHUHVHWXSWRGR7KLVLV3HWHU6LQJHU¶VYLHZRQDUWJDOOHULHVµThey were set up for a 
different purpose, and to use their funds to help the global poor would surely be a breach of their 
founding deeds or statutory obligations and could invite litigation from past donors who may 
perceive it as a violation of the purposes for which they had donated¶ (Singer 2015, p. 123). This 
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PLJKWEHFRPSDWLEOHZLWKVWURQJVLGHFRQVWUDLQWVRQKDUPLQJEXWVXUHO\ZRXOGQ¶WEHFRPSDWLEOH
with groups bearing the full complement of moral obligations that individuals bear. 
Another consideration against parity is that groups are made of members and discharge 
their obligations through members, and members will already have the full complement of moral 
REOLJDWLRQV,IJURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQVDUHRQDSDUZLWKLQGLYLGXDOV¶REOLJDWLRQVWKHQLWVHHPVVRPH
individuals (namely members) will end up with more than their fair share of obligations. 
A final consideration is generated by the difference both between groups and individuals, 
and between groups of different kinds. (Major differences between groups include their scale 
(e.g. number of members), purpose (e.g. sports teams cf. churches cf. international 
organizations), and level of formal organization (e.g. conventions cf. written constitutions).) The 
ILUVWNLQGRIGLIIHUHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHVWRU\DERXWLQGLYLGXDOV¶REOLJDWLRQVZLOOQRWEHWKHVDPH
DVWKHVWRU\DERXWJURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQVDQGWKHVHFRQGNLQGRIGLIIHUHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWREOLJDWLRQV
will apply to groups only in a piecemeal way, varying with the nature of the group in question. 
In this paper, we defend parity EHWZHHQ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ DQG JURXSV¶ REOLJDWLRQV ,Q §I, we 
outline our preferred conception of group agents. This will establish the possibility that groups 
bear obligations, and the plausibility of the idea that some real-world groups bear obligations. In 
§II, we turn to the scope issue. Instead of arguing from general facts about agency and 
obligation, our argument starts from specific facts about different kinds of obligation. This is 
because, as we will show, different kinds of obligation have different preconditions. Some 
require that the agent has a stable identity across time, some require that the agent maintains 
certain sorts of relationships, some require that the agent operates in particular contexts, and so 
on. If an agent does not meet the preconditions of a particular kind of obligation, then the agent 
is not a candidate bearer of obligations of that kind. We argue that, by and large, collectives do 
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meet the preconditions of six commonly-recognised kinds of obligation. (Of course, some 
collectives fail to meet some preconditions. But, we argue, so do some individuals.) 
In §III, we turn to the strength issue. Here, our argument generalises away from the 
SDUWLFXODU SUHFRQGLWLRQV RI SDUWLFXODU NLQGV RI REOLJDWLRQ :H FRQVLGHU ZKHWKHU JURXSV¶
obligations (of whatever kind) are inherently more (or less) demanding WKDQ LQGLYLGXDOV¶
REOLJDWLRQVDQGZKHWKHUJURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQVDUHDOZDys secondary WRLQGLYLGXDOV¶REOLJDWLRQVLQ
WKDWWKHODWWHUOLPLWWKHGHPDQGVRIWKHIRUPHU:HGHQ\WKHUH¶VDQ\GLIIHUHQFHLQGHPDQGLQJQHVV
E\UHEXWWLQJWZRDUJXPHQWVWKDWLPSO\DGLVSDULW\LQGHPDQGLQJQHVV:HDUJXHWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶
obligations limit thH GHPDQGV RI JURXSV¶ REOLJDWLRQV RQO\ LI RQH LQVLVWV WKDW LQGLYLGXDOV¶
REOLJDWLRQVDOZD\VWDNHSULRULW\RYHUJURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQVʊan assumption we find ill-motivated. 
Our argument builds on existing literature in two ways. First, some have argued that 
SDUWLFXODUNLQGVRIJURXSVKDYHREOLJDWLRQVWKDWGLIIHUIURPLQGLYLGXDOV¶ obligations. For example. 
John Broome has claimed that indiYLGXDOV¶ climate change-related obligations are simply not to 
do harm, while JRYHUQPHQWV¶ climate change-related obligations are to do good.2 One possible 
explanation of this difference is that all groups have different kinds of obligations from 
individuals. This general difference ZRXOGDOVRH[SODLQ6LQJHU¶VYLHZRQDUWJDOOHULHVPHQWLRQHG
above. Despite this possibility, there is almost no explicit discussion of the parity thesis in the 
literature. It is more common for authors to simply assume that something like it is true (e.g., 
Barry 2005; Caney 2014; Reidy 2004; Welsh and Banda 2010). Our second contribution, then, is 
                                                 
2
 Broome (2012, 64-JLYHVWKUHHUHDVRQVIRUWKLVGLVSDULW\)LUVWJRYHUQPHQWV¶DFWLRQVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRFKDQJH
who will be born, meaning the µnon-identity problem¶ looms large for them DQGWKXVLW¶VQRWFOHDUwho their actions 
might harm. But we take this to be a difference of degree, not kind, between individuals and groups. Second, 
governments have a µserious duty to make life good ... That duty bears less heavily on individuals.¶ (2012, 65) We 
view this as worryingly question-begging. Third, acting to alleviate climate change is not part of the best way for 
individuals to promote the good, whereas it is for governments, because they have more resources. Again, this is a 
difference of degree rather than kind. 
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to argue for the plausibility of the thesis, rather than simply assume it, as many other authors do. 
There is plenty of discussion about whether groups can bear obligations at all, and plenty of 
discussion alleging that particular groups bear particular obligations. But there seems to be 
DOPRVWQRGLVFXVVLRQDERXWZKHWKHUWKHUH¶VSDULW\ LQ WKHVFRSHDQGVWUHQJWKRI LQGLYLGXDOV¶DQG
colleFWLYHV¶REOLJDWLRQV:HVWDUWWKDWGLVFXVVLRQKHUH 
Importantly, our concern is with group agents¶ REOLJDWLRQV :H XVH µcollective¶ 
synonymously with µgroup agent¶, to mean a group that meets criteria discussed in §I. We put 
aside the question of whether non-agent groups can bear duties. (On this, see Feinberg 1968; 
Wringe 2014.) So we will often drop the µagent¶ modifier. We are also not concerned with the 
TXHVWLRQ RI KRZ WKH FRVWV RI GLVFKDUJLQJ JURXSV¶ REOLJDWLRQV VKRXOG EH GLVWULEXWHG DPRQJVW
members. WH ZLOO DOOXGH WR WKLV TXHVWLRQ ZKHQ ZH GLVFXVV ZKHWKHU JURXSV¶ REOLJDWLRQV DUH
secondary to those of their members, but we do not claim to answer it.3 We focus solely on 
HVWDEOLVKLQJWKHVFRSHDQGVWUHQJWKRIFROOHFWLYHV¶REOLJDWLRQVWKHPVHOYHV 
 
§I. ColleFWLYHV¶2EOLJDWLRQV 
We should begin by explaining how groups can bear obligations at all. This requires that we say 
something about the sense in which groups are agents. We will work with a basic functionalist 
µbelief/desire¶ model of agency, on which having agency means having (1) something that plays 
the role of desires (e.g., wanted outcomes, goals, preferences), which, in combination with (2) 
VRPHWKLQJ WKDW SOD\V WKH UROH RI EHOLHIV DERXW RQH¶V HQYLURQPHQW PRYH RQH WR PDNH 
something that plays the role of decisions about how to act in that environment (List and Pettit 
                                                 
3
 Other authors have answered this question (Miller 2004; Pasternak 2011; Pasternak 2013; Stilz 2011). Most of 
these answers could be generalised to many kinds of group and many kinds of obligation, and each is compatible 
with our view on parity in scope and strength.  
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2011, 20). (We will drop the µsomething that plays the role of¶ qualifier, but it remains implicit.) 
Decision-making procedures allow agents to move from (1) and (2) to (3). 
A group can bear agency in this sense, by having a group-level decision-making 
procedure²a process that takes in reasons, and outputs aims and instructions²that is 
operationally distinct from the procedures held respectively by members. It is operationally 
distinct in that its method for processing reasons is different from the method of any one member 
when deciding for herself. 7KH JURXS¶V SURFHGXUH WDNHV DV LQSXWV WKH EHOLHIV DQG GHVLUHV RI
members, and/or the beliefs and desires of the group that have been established by earlier 
decisions of the group. It then processes these inputs in its own distinctive way²simple 
examples include majoritarian or dictatorship rules²to produce decisions, some of which might 
be of the form µthe group will perform action X.¶ When the procedure produces outputs of this 
decision-to-act kind, it will also distribute roles to members that are jointly sufficient for the 
performance of X.  
Metaphorically, one can think of group decision-making procedures as algorithms, 
functions, flow-charts, or sets of conditionals that move from the desires and/or beliefs of 
individuals to desires and/or beliefs of the group, and so ultimately to decisions of the group. Or, 
the procedure might go straight from individual decisions to group decisions, bypassing 
individual desires and beliefs. (List and Pettit (2011, ch. 3) give a survey of some different 
decision rules collective decision-making procedures can use.) Groups with decision-making 
procedures also have an organisational structure²a set of roles and relationships between those 
roles. At any given time, this structure is instantiated by the members of the group. The group 
itself can be identified with this instantiated structure (Richie 2013). The organisational features 
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of that structure are what allows the group to bear and operate its distinctive decision-making 
procedure. 
There are several accounts of how groups become agents (e.g. Pettit and Schweikard 
2006; French 1979). Depending on the model one endorses, one will make different judgments 
about whether some groups are agents. For example, on some models, a group of friends going 
to the movies might count as a group agent. On another model, it might not. We are neutral 
between such models. All that matters for us is that some groups are agents. Our argument 
concerns whichever groups are agents according to the correct model. 
We will assume that the formal, long-lasting groups that structure our social, political, 
and economic world²such as states, firms, churches, and international organisations²bear 
group agency. To motivate this, consider that groups like states and firms are highly organised, 
with a range of intricately related roles. They have complex decision procedures, which 
systematically produce a range of decisions and a distribution of yet more roles for enacting 
those decisions. The result of these processes within the collective is a set of decisions, a set of 
individual roles for enacting those decisions, and a distribution of the roles among individuals: 
results produced not by one member²RU E\ WKH FRQMXQFWLRQ RI HDFK PHPEHU¶V LQGHSHQGHQW
processing²but by the members taken together as a system. The actions of members partly 
constitute actions of the group when the members act within and because of their role.  
The decision-making procedure of a moral agent is one in which moral reasons can play 
the role of desires. One might wonder whether groups can meet this condition. We think many 
can. After all, human moral agents are able to recognise the moral reasons that apply to agents 
othHUWKDQWKHPVHOYHV,IDJURXS¶VPHPEHUVDUHKXPDQPRUDODJHQWVDQGVRFDQUHFRJQLVHPRUDO
reasons, then it is natural to assume they can design a group decision-making procedure into 
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which they can put the moral reasons the group should respond to. And it is natural to assume 
they can design the procedure so it processes the moral reasons in the way morality demands of 
the group, such that the group forms its own intentions to act in response to those reasons. If all 
this is possible, then a group can intend to act (and act) in a way appropriately responsive those 
reasons, given that members designed the procedure well and put the moral reasons into the 
procedure at the right point. All this is to say that groups can bear and discharge duties. Much 
more could be said about group moral agents. We hope these brief remarks motivate the thought 
that at least some actual groups are agents that can bear obligations.4  
 
§II. Scope of Obligations 
As discussed above, others have convincingly argued that group agents meet the minimal 
conditions for agency and obligation (e.g. French 1984; List and Pettit 2011; Pettit 2007). So 
groups, we will assume, can have at least some kinds of obligation. The scope question is 
whether they can have the same kinds individuals can have. This question naturally lends itself to 
a piecemeal strategy, in which one examines in turn the preconditions of each kind of obligation, 
asking of each: can group agents satisfy these preconditions?5 We will often ask this question in 
a less abstract way, by asking of each kind of obligation: is there a situation in which we would 
judge that an obligation of that kind falls on a collective? We argue that the answer is always 
affirmative. Obviously, there are numerous kinds of obligation, and it would be tedious for the 
reader if we worked through all of them. So we will comment on six commonly evoked kinds of 
                                                 
4
 See similarly Pettit 2007, 184-6. Hedahl (2013) points out that some groups cannot recognise moral reasons. We 
are not talking about such collectives, just as we are not talking about similar individuals (e.g., some children or 
psychopaths). 
5
 3HUKDSVDOHVVSLHFHPHDOVWUDWHJ\FRXOGJHQHUDWHDQDQVZHUWRWKLVTXHVWLRQ:H¶UHQRWGHQ\LQJWKLVLWLVVLPSO\
not the strategy we take. 
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obligation, focusing on four, and in particular on those of their preconditions that are most 
challenging for groups. 
 These six kinds are all obligations to act, not obligations to have certain attitudes or 
WKRXJKWVRUIHHOLQJV:KHWKHUJURXSVFDQKDYHWKHODWWHUREOLJDWLRQVGHSHQGVRQRQH¶VDFFRXQWRI
morally valuable attitudes, thoughts, and feelings²and, in particular, whether these states 
require phenomenal consciousness. (On such issues, see Björnsson and Hess forthcoming; 
Gilbert 2002; Scheve and Salmela (eds) 2014; Schwitzgebel 2015.) It will also matter whether 
one views these mental states as intrinsically morally valuable, or whether they are an instrument 
that could be replaced with a different instrument in the group case. We lack space to deal with 
these issues here.6  
 A final clarification before beginning the argument. When we argue that group moral 
agents satisfy the preconditions, we do not mean that every group moral agent does (or can), as a 
matter of fact, satisfy them²but then, neither does (or can) every individual. When a group fails 
to (be able to) meet a precondition, we argue that it is not because it is a group that it fails in this 
way. We argue this by showing that individuals can also fail to meet the same precondition in just 
the same way. It is consistent with this parity claim that, for some preconditions, groups fail to 
meet them more often than individuals fail. Our point is that there is nothing particular to groups 
(i.e., not also found in individuals) that entails such failure. 
                                                 
6
 That said, if such mental states require phenomenal consciousness (which, suppose, groups cannot have), and in 
circumstance C, individuals should have the mental state without performing a related action, and in C, groups 
should perform the related action despite lacking the mental state, then groups might have obligations to act in 
circumsWDQFHVZKHUHLQGLYLGXDOVKDYHREOLJDWLRQVWRKDYHPHQWDOVWDWHV7KHUHVXOWZRXOGEHDGLVSDULW\LQJURXSV¶
DQG LQGLYLGXDOV¶ REOLJDWLRQV-to-act: a seeming counterexample to our act-restricted parity claim. (Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for this.) However, as stated above, our parity claim is about kinds and strength of obligation, 
not about particular obligations in particular circumstances. 
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 In our opening paragraph, we mentioned six kinds of obligation: keep promises, do not 
cause harm, give up benefits of injustice, be partial to those one is closest with,  assist those in 
QHHGDQGUHFWLI\SDVWKDUPV:HGRQ¶WFODLPWKLVOLVWLVH[KDXVWLYHRQO\WKDWLWLVUHSUHVHQWDWLYH
of the sorts of obligation moral philosophers have been centrally interested in.) For two of these, 
theUH¶VQRLQWHUHVWLQJFKDOOHQJHWRWKHLUDSSOLFDWLRQLQWKHFDVHRIFROOHFWLYHV6RZHZLOOGLVFXVV
those only briefly. 
 First, obligations not to cause harm are plausibly side constraints on the way that any 
agent²individual or collective²conducts its operations. Because the justifications for 
obligations against harm traditionally make reference to either the rights of the individual at risk 
of harm (Locke 1689), or the general good that derives from observing the duty (Mill 1859), 
these rationales create no problems for groups. They refer to facts that are not about the 
obligation-EHDUHU EXW DERXW WKH REMHFW RI WKH REOLJDWLRQ ,I WKHUH¶V DQ\ FKDOOHQJH WR SDULW\ LW
seems to arise over how collectives can satisfy the precondition µis able to cause harm¶. 
CoOOHFWLYHV¶DFWLRQVDUHFRPSRVLWHVRIPHPEHUV¶DFWLRQVWDNHQWRJHWKHUGRHVQ¶WWKDWPDNHWKHP
joint actions? In fact, this problem is excluded by our focus on group agents. When groups meet 
the conditions discussed in §I, they count as single authors of actions, so we can coherently 
attribute the causation of a harm (via the relevant action) to the collective. Problems in 
interpreting the prohibition on causing harm do arise in thinking about joint harming²in 
particular, in thinking about overdetermined harming. But both collective and individual agents 
can be involved in such harms (on joint harming, two states can act in concert to invade another; 
on overdetermined harming, a third state can join the invasion when the invasion would have 
succeeded without it), so the resolution of those problems does not differ depending on whether 
the agents involved are individual or collective. 
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 Second, obligations to assist those in need require the existence of need and the capacity 
of an agent to meet it. Collectives will often have that capacity (and often their capacities to 
DVVLVWZLOOIDURXWSDFHLQGLYLGXDOV¶FDSDFLWLHVVRWKHUH¶VQRLQ-principle challenge to their having 
obligations to assist. The challenge enters not with scope (whether collectives have duties to 
DVVLVW EXWZLWK VWUHQJWK ZKHWKHU D FROOHFWLYH¶V pro tanto obligation to assist relates to its all-
things-considered obligations in the same way as for individuals). At that point, there is perhaps 
reason to think collectives will be more often justified in prioritizing the ends their members 
established them to pursue over their obligations to assist. We return to this issue in §III. 
 ,QWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKLVVHFWLRQZHDGGUHVVWKHPDLQFKDOOHQJHVWRWKLQNLQJWKHUH¶VSDULW\
for the other four kinds of obligation: keep promises, give up benefits of injustice, be partial to 
those we are closest with, and rectify past harms. Promising and rectification face a common 
challenge, so we will take them together, then take the remaining two in turn. 
 
II.A. Promissory Obligations & Rectificatory Obligations 
Before addressing the challenge to the idea that groups bear these two kinds of obligation, we 
should say more about how we understand each of them. We will take promising first. 
Promissory obligations are a species of a genus that includes both promissory and contractual 
REOLJDWLRQVWKHODWWHULQYROYHVFRQVLGHUDWLRQWKHIRUPHUGRHVQ¶W:LWKLQWKLVJHQXVZHIRFXVRQ
promising for two reasons. First, it has a well-developed philosophical literature. Second, 
promissory obligations loom large for groups. We hold political parties to account for their 
election pledges; corporations to account for their advertisements; and (to the extent we can) 
international organisations to account for their expressed aspirations. Our question is whether 
this practice is justified. 
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:H¶OO XVH WKH SRSXODU µnormative powers¶ view of promising (Owens 2006; Shiffrin 
2008). On this view, to promise is to exercise a normative power: we generate specific 
obligations for ourselves, and rights for others, by making promissory utterances. Recent 
advocates of this view justify it by reference to the interests that are served in the exercise of this 
power. According to David Owens, this is µan authority interest: I often want it to be the case that 
I, rather than you, have the authority to determine what you do¶ (2006, 51). According to Seana 
Shiffrin, this is an interest in having the µability to engage in special [i.e., close] relationships in a 
morally good way, under conditions of equal respect¶ (2008, 485). 
On this rationale, if groups are to be involved to the give-and-take practice of promising, 
then groups must have interests in having authority over others or in having close relationships 
with others. And for particular promissory obligations to bear, groups must be able to make 
utterances. There are no problems here. On the functionalist model of agency, entities with 
decision-making procedures can produce decisions about what the entity desires. The entity can 
be understood as having an interest in those desires being fulfilled. And it looks plausible that 
many groups have a desire²an interest²in both (a) holding authority over others and (b) having 
close relationships with others. On (a), simply consider the archetype preferences of states, 
churches, and corporations, which is to hold authority over their members qua individuals, and 
often over non-PHPEHUVWRR7KHVHSUHIHUHQFHVJHQHUDWHJURXSV¶LQWHUHVWVLQUHFHLYLQJSURPLVHV
which in turn generating interests in giving promises, as a way of indicating a commitment to the 
practice. On (b), consider the close relations that group agents often have with other group 
agents, such as allied countries, political coalition partners, and sister organisations, and the ways 
in which group agents try to forge such close relationships by making promises, often through 
formal mechanisms such as contract law.  
14 
 
$GGLWLRQDOO\LW¶VSODXVLEOHWKDWJURXSVFDQPDNHXWWHUDQFHV*URXSVGRWKLVLQWZRVWHSV
First, the decision-making procedure produces decisions of the form µthe group commits to C¶ 
and µUROHEHDUHU5ZLOOSXEOLFLVHWKHJURXS¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR&¶ Second, role bearer R publicises 
WKHJURXS¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR&DQGGRHVVRLZLWKRXWYLRODWLQJDQ\RWKHUDVSHFWVRIKHUUROHLQ
the group and (ii) paUWO\ EHFDXVH RI WKH JURXS¶V GHFLVLRQ WKDW VKH VKRXOG GR WKLV ,W ORRNV OLNH
collectives can both make promises and be obliged to keep them. 
Rectificatory obligations are much more straightforward. We understand them in the 
following way: if one violates an obligation, then one acquires a duty to compensate for, undo, or 
RWKHUZLVHµUHFWLI\¶WKHYLRODWLRQ7KLVNLQGRIREOLJDWLRQLVMXVWLILHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWRQHKDVnot 
followed through on some other obligation. 
As we mentioned above, both promissory and rectificatory obligations face a common 
challenge when it comes to their application to collectives. The challenge arises because of issues 
VXUURXQGLQJJURXSV¶LGHQWLW\DFURVVWLPH,QGLYLGXDOVDUHUDUHO\WKRXJKWWRXQGHUJRFKDQJHVWKDW
block their duties to keep promises, or rectify harms done, before the change. For groups, 
though, such changes might be systematically caused by features particular to groups. This 
would create a disanalogy in the way groups and individuals should be treated with regard to 
obligations to keep their promises and to rectify wrongs. Think about a promise that a 
corporation makes to its shareholders, soon before being subsumed by a larger corporation. Or 
consider the obligation of West Germany to pay reparations to Israel after World War II: one 
might think that West Germany was not descended in the right way from Nazi Germany, because 
that was West Germany together with East Germany, and furthermore under radically different 
leadership. So the duty here, it might seem, is not rectificatory. (This is not to say that there was 
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no moral obligation on West Germany, just that it was not an obligation to rectify a violation 
committed by West Germany.)  
:HZRQ¶W WDNHDVWDQGRQZKHWKHUWKHVHFDVHVLQYROYHWKHµGHVFHQW¶UHODWLRQDSSURSULDWH 
for promissory and rectificatory obligations. All we need, for the parity claim to hold, is that later 
groups are often descended from earlier groups in the way relevant to these obligations and that 
there is nothing particular to group agency that systematically undermines the descent relation. 
7ZR VXEVWDQWLYH SURSRVDOV IRU WKH DSSURSULDWH µGHVFHQW¶ UHODWLRQ IRU LQGLYLGXDOV DUH DV IROORZV
2OVRQ7KHUHLVDSV\FKRORJLFDODSSURDFKDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK%¶VPHQWDOVWDWHVPXVWEH
caused in the right way E\$¶VPHQWDOVWDWHV7KHUHLVDOVRDVRPDWLFDSSURDFKRQZKLFKSK\VLFDO
continuity connects B to A. It is obviously beyond our scope to discuss all the issues here. The 
key point is this: whichever descent relation one prefers, it can be readily applied to groups.  
Psychological descent will amount to connection (of some appropriate form²here this is 
GLVSXWHEHWZHHQWKHJURXS¶VHDUOLHUDQGODWHUEHOLHIVGHVLUHVDQGGHFLVLRQV6XFKGHVFHQWRIWHQ
holds: group agents have the beliefs, desires, and decisions formed by past exercises of the 
JURXS¶VGHFLVLRQ-making procedures by past members of the group; unless those beliefs, desires, 
DQG GHFLVLRQV KDYH EHHQ VXSHUVHGHG E\ PRUH UHFHQW H[HUFLVHV RI WKH JURXS¶V GHFLVLRQ-making 
procedures. Superseding of this kind is analogous to an individual changing her mind, and is 
consistent with psychological descent.  
Physical continuity of a group amounts to substantial continuity in its membership. 
Requiring perfect continuity would lead to the implausible view that, for example, a new country 
comes into existence every time a new citizen is born. There is minimal continuity when there 
are no abrupt and complete changes in membership, such that not one individual is a member at 
both t1 and t2. Substantial continuity exists when a substantial number of members remain 
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members between t1 and t2, even while new members join (or are born) and old members leave 
(or die). That means a group can entirely change its membership over time, without becoming a 
different group. (It is impossible to say in the abstract exactly how many (or which) members 
must remain for substantial continuity to hold²this will vary with the size and structure of the 
JURXS7KLVLVWKHVDPHUHDVRQIRUWKLQNLQJWKDW7KHVHXV¶VVKLSLVWKHVDPHVKLSHYHQZKHn all 
the original parts have eventually been replaced, and for thinking it would be a different ship if 
we were to simply demolish the original and build a new one where the original used to stand. 
,W¶VDOVRWKHVDPHUHDVRQIRUWKLQNLQJWKDWWKHUH¶VQRWD new human individual every time a finger 
is sliced off or a beard grows²and that there would be if the human was destroyed and 
'DYLGVRQ¶VVZDPSSHUVRQDSSHDUHGLQWKHLUSODFHVHHHJ/HZLV 
However, these descent relations do not always apply cleanly to actual groups. Consider 
fusion and fission. Fusion occurs when a group is formed by (partially or totally) combining two 
or more previously-existing groups, which then cease to exist. Fission occurs when two or more 
groups arise out of one previously existing group, which then ceases to exist. Nazi Germany 
became East Germany and West Germany (fission), and later reunified (fusion). In such cases, 
we have change that is the result of an earlier decision procedure, with substantial continuity in 
membership, but we have a different number of entities than we had previously (Schwarz 2014a; 
2014b).7 
'RHVWKLVPHDQWKDWWKHVFRSHRIJURXSV¶GXWLHVGRHVQRWH[WHQGWRNHHSLQJSURPLVHVRU
rectifying past violations? No, on both counts. Fusion and fission are simply problems that occur 
more often IRUJURXSVWKDQIRU LQGLYLGXDOV7KH\¶UHDOVRHDVLHUWRUHFRJQLVHLQJURXSVEHFDXVH
                                                 
7
 This is a time-indexed view; on a 4-dimensionalist picture there is still one entity, albeit Y-shaped (if fission), or 
diamond-shaped (if fission and then fusion). 
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more visible. When a country divides, we see the effects everywhere: the Berlin Wall divided 
East from West Berlin and largely preveQWHGPL[LQJRI WKH WZRJURXSV¶PHPEHUV%\FRQWUDVW
when an individual suffers dissociative personality disorder, we still see only one physical form, 
and when two individuals become so interdependent that they almost wholly merge their 
identities, we still see two physical forms. But frequency and ease of recognition of fission and 
fusion do not undermine the parity claim. Individual identity can cease, just as group identity 
can. 
As with individuals, there are two ways to go on fission or fusion cases when it comes to 
JURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQV WR UHFWLI\YLRODWLRQV7KHILUVW LV WRVD\ WKDW WKH ODWHUDQGHDUOLHUJURXSVDUH
associated in a morally relevant way, whether or not the relation is one of identity. Continuity 
across time establishes a relationship between the earlier and later entities²a kind of associative 
taint²that gives the later one obligations to rectify the violations of the earlier one. The second 
URXWHLVWRVD\WKHODWHUHQWLW\RUHQWLWLHVGRQRWKDYHREOLJDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHHDUOLHUHQWLW\¶V or 
HQWLWLHV¶YLRODWLRQV:KDWHYHUZHZRXOGVD\DERXWLQGLYLGXDOIXVLRQRUILVVLRQFDVHVFDQH[WHQG
mutatis mutandis, to groups. 
 
II.B. Beneficiary Obligations 
The idea has recently been gaining currency that we have obligations when we benefit from the 
wrongs of others. The precise nature of these obligations is under dispute. Some argue that if one 
intentionally benefits or welcomes the benefits, the obligation is stronger  (Pasternak 2014). 
Others suggest these obligations arise when the benefit is received non-voluntarily, but that there 
must be a victim of the wrong, who benefits from the discharge of the beneficiary obligation 
(Butt 2007; Butt 2014). Still others argue that one can have a duty simply to disgorge the benefits 
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of injustice, regardless of whether there is (or ever was) an identifiable victim (Goodin and Barry 
2014). Whichever specification one uses, the fact remains that groups regularly benefit from 
injustices. States²particularly those who already have high material wealth²benefit from 
XQMXVWWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV)LUPVEHQHILWIURPJRYHUQPHQWV¶XQMXVWFRUSRUDWHWD[SROLFLHV$QGVR
on. Do beneficiary obligations throw up particular problems for groups? 
One might think that firms, in particular, are resistant to this obligation. Imagine a coffee 
shop that is grossly vandalised. During repairs, its regular customers head to the coffee shop 
down the road. The second shop benefits from an injustice that is done to the first one.8 Yet we 
would strongly resist the idea that the second shop thereby owes anything to the first shop. 
Indeed, we could make the case stronger: imagine the second shop puts up an advertising sign 
RXWVLGHWKHILUVWRQHLQWHQGLQJWREHQHILWE\DWWUDFWLQJWKHILUVWVKRS¶VUHJXODUFXVWRPHUVLQWRLWV
GRRUV ,W¶V VWLOO XQFOHDU Zhether the second shop derives any obligations from these benefits. 
Companies enter the market in full knowledge of the possible misfortunes that might befall them, 
DQGLQDZDUHQHVVRIWKHYDJDULHVRIWKHLUFXVWRPHUV¶WDVWHVDQGOR\DOWLHV6RLWVHHPVFRPSanies 
do not have beneficiary obligations. 
This is all plausible. But it does not speak to a disanalogy between group and individual 
agents. Replace each coffee shop²which implies a team of owners, investors, managers, etc.²
with a single person selling flowers. Each is under the radar of the tax system, such that they are 
not legally incorporated. Suppose one seller has all their flowers stolen, leading to a boom in 
sales for the other seller. Again, facts about markets, known risks, and competition lead us away 
from thinking the second seller should disgorge or pay back these benefits, even if they are 
welcomed by her²even if they are intended by her. So there is no special problem for groups 
                                                 
8
 For a similar case see Haydar & Øverland 2014, p. 351. 
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when it comes to beneficiary duties in the market. There may well be special problems for 
beneficiary duties in market contexts as compared with non-market contexts. But groups are a 
UHGKHUULQJIRUWKHVHSUREOHPV7KLVPHDQVZHGRQ¶WKDYHWRVROYHWKHPLQRUGHUWRYLHZJURXSV
as falling under beneficiary obligations. 
There are, however, other contexts in which groups seem to avoid beneficiary duties. 
Imagine a government has a policy that unjustly favours Christian organisations over Muslim 
ones when it comes to funding, taxation, government promotion of the Creed, and so on (make 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\ DV H[WUHPH DVQHHGHG IRU LW WREH FOHDUO\ XQMXVW6XSSRVH WKLVSROLF\
leads many individuals to reject Muslim organisations and join Christian ones. This can be 
construed as a benefit to the Christian organisations and a harm to the Muslim organisations, 
LQVRIDU DV µJDLQLQJ PHPEHUV¶ SOD\V WKH UROH RI D GHVLUH LQ WKH GHFLVLRQ-making procedures of 
proselytising religions. The harm is, ex hypothesi, unjust. Do the Christian organisations owe 
anything to the Muslim ones?  
Before answering that question, consider another case. Take the state as employer of civil 
servants. Imagine the state unjustly favours men over women when it comes to employment, 
promotion, paid leave, mentorship, and so on (make the policy as extreme as needed for it to be 
clearly unjust). Suppose this policy leads to Rawiri being employed (or promoted, or given leave, 
RU PHQWRUHG RYHU 1JDLR 1JDLR ORVHV RXW DQG 5DZLUL EHQHILWV EHFDXVH RI WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
discriminatory policy. Does Rawiri owe anything to Ngaio?  
Our contention is that there is no good reason to answer differently in the 
Christian/Muslim case than in the Ngaio/Rawiri case. Both are cases where an unjust 
government policy²something over which the protagonists have no control²leads one group or 
individual to receive benefits that should have gone to some other group or individual. Either 
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obligations are owed in both cases, or in neither case. We cannot imagine what reason there 
could be to give different judgments on these cases.  
These two pairs of thought experiments (the coffee shops vs. flower sellers; the religious 
organisations vs. civil servants) do not prove that groups have beneficiary obligations in just the 
same way as individuals. But the debate about the preconditions of beneficiary obligations is 
nascent. So to prove the parity here, we would have to go through a huge number of paired 
thought experiments, each sensitive to different preconditions, tweaking the set-up in each case 
so that the only variable was whether the (putatively) duty-bearing agent was individual or 
collective. This would be a cumbersome task. The two pairs of thought experiments we have 
outlined what we see as the main problem cases for parity in beneficiary duties, giving us reason 
(though defeasible) to believe that parity holds here. 
 
II.C. Associative Obligations 
Following Samuel Scheffler, we understand associative obligations as µresponsibilities that the 
members of significant social groups and the participants in close personal relationships have to 
each other¶ (2001, 49). For individuals, these are usually held towards friends, family, or 
PHPEHUVRIRQH¶VFXOWXUDOJURXS 
Again, there is dispute over the justification of associative obligations. There are three 
rough camps. The first sees associative obligations as grounded in a voluntary act by their bearer. 
These will likely collapse into a tacit promissory obligation. Having already discussed 
promissory obligations, we put this view aside. The second sees associative obligations as 
grounded in the fact that our personal relatives (friends, family, perhaps co-nationals) are 
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especially vulnerable to our actions. On this view, associative obligations transmute into 
assistance obligations. Again, we put this view aside. 
The third view, on which we will focus, sees associative obligations as irreducible to 
REOLJDWLRQVRIRWKHUNLQGV6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWLVSDUDGLJPDWLF+HVD\VWKDWµRQH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSV
to other people give rise to special responsibilities to those people when they are relationships 
that one has reason to [non-instrumentally] value¶ (1997, 197-8). The precise content of the 
obligations generated by such relationships varies depending on the µnature of the relationships¶ 
(1997, 199). For example, the nature and norms of friendship vary across cultures, meaning the 
specific associative obligations between friends vary across cultures. The generally-described 
justification, based on relationships with objective non-instrumental value, applies universally.  
For groups to have associative obligations, it must be possible for relations between 
groups (or between groups and individuals) to be non-instrumentally valuable: valuable not as a 
means to anything else. To make this concrete, take two states²say, Australia and New Zealand. 
These two states are connected by a closely shared history, in which they were each colonised by 
the United Kingdom, before gradually gaining independence. They fought together in two world 
wars, are perceived by members to have a similar culture and outlook on life, have high levels of 
mutual immigration, and are committed to (more or less) similar values. This connection gives 
rise at least to perceived obligations between the states: obligations, for example, to assist one 
another in the case of a natural disaster. These obligations are perceived to hold even in the 
absence of express promises of such assistance, and would hold even if some other agent (say, 
the United States) was better-placed to provide assistance. So these obligations are not subject to 
the promissory or assistance-based interpretations of associative obligations. Instead, we can 
explain them by acknowledging the complex value²the value of shared experiences, shared 
22 
 
perceptions, and shared circumstances²that is realised by the past, present, and projected future 
interactions between these countries. 
6FKHIIOHU¶V DFFRXQW FDQ DOVR EH DSSOLHG WR WZR RWKHU NLQGV RI JURXS-group relationships. 
First, consider group-group relationships that are only instrumentally valuable: the relationship 
between two banks competing in the market, or between two civil society organisations with 
fundamentally different aims. It is hard to make sense of associative obligations between such 
pairings²and it is also hard to make sense of the possibility that such relationships are non-
instrumentally valuable. So when we resist positing associative obligations between groups, we 
can make sense of this in terms of the absence of the non-instrumentally valuable relationship 
that exists in the Australia/New Zealand case. As for beneficiary obligations, notice that the same 
is true of individuals in competitive contexts: the lack of an non-instrumentally valuable 
association implies a lack of associative obligations. 
Second, there are group-group relationships that are not dyadic, but are constituted by 
membership in a social group. Scheffler points out that associative obligations are held between 
individuals who are co-members of non-instrumentally valuable social groups, even if the two 
PHPEHUVDUHXQDZDUHRIRQHDQRWKHU¶VH[LVWHQFH6FKHIfler gives the example of two members 
of a fan club (1997, 198).) For groups, the relevant µsocial groups¶ have groups as members: 
social groups like µinternational civil society¶ or µethical companies¶ or µdemocratic states¶. As 
long as such social groups are non-instrumentally valuable, they can give rise to obligations for 
members²say, obligations to help one another maintain the ethos or achieve the characteristic 
DLPVRIWKHVRFLDOJURXS¶VPHPEHUV 
)LQDOO\ 6FKHIIOHU¶V DFFRXQW FDQ EH DSSOLHG WR JURXS-individual relationships. Most 
obviously, groups might have non-instrumentally valuable relationships with their members. It 
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might be valuable that I am a member of this club or nation or church, not as a means to anything 
else, but simply in itself. This cRXOGJHQHUDWHREOLJDWLRQV IRUPH WRSXUVXHP\FOXE¶V LQWHUHVWV
over the interests of other clubs, and for the club to pursue my interests over the interests of non-
members. This might appear to be a disparity: groups have a kind of obligation²an associative 
obligation to their members²that individuals do not have (and do not have because proper parts 
are agents in one case and not the other). However, while there surely are associative obligations 
between groups and members, these are not a further kind of obligation. They fall under the 
umbrella of associative obligations, which are premised on a relation of non-instrumental value 
between agents. Because some agents have other agents as proper parts, it stands to reason that 
some associative obligations hold µinwardly¶WKDWLVWRWKRVHSDUWVPHPEHUV%XWLW¶VVWLOOWKH
LQWULQVLFDOO\YDOXDEOH UHODWLRQVKLS WKDW¶VGRLQJ WKHGXW\-generating and kind-defining work, not 
the inward-GLUHFWHGQHVV6R WKLV LVQRWDGLVSDULW\ IRU WKHVFRSHRIFROOHFWLYH¶VDQG LQGLYLGXDO¶V
obligations. 
  
§III. The Strength of Obligations  
We have suggested that each kind of obligation on our paradigmatic list extends to group agents. 
Nonetheless, perhaps all obligations have less strength for groups, or are less demanding for 
groups, than they are for individuals. We take these problems to cut across the distinctions 
between the six kinds of obligations we have discussed. This gives us a reason to discuss these 
problems in a way that is general and neutral between the six kinds of obligation. We think there 
are two important questions here: ZKHWKHUJURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQVDUH LQKHUHQWO\PRUH RU LQGHHG
less) demanding WKDQ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ REOLJDWLRQV DQG ZKHWKHU JURXSV¶ REOLJDWLRQV DUH DOZD\V
secondary WR LQGLYLGXDOV¶ REOLJDWLRQV :H ZLOO DUJXH WKDW JURXSV¶ DQG LQGLYLGXDOV¶ REOLJDWLRQV
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make the same contribution to what the agent all-things-considered ought to do. By this, we 
mean that differences in the strength of particular obligations of particular agents do not track, or 
arise from, thRVHDJHQWV¶EHLQJJURXSVRULQGLYLGXDOV 
  
III.A. Demandingness 
7KHGHPDQGLQJQHVVSUREOHPLV WKLVKROGLQJIL[HG WKHNLQGRIGXW\DQG WKHDJHQW¶VFDSDFLW\ WR
exercise the duty, is the threshold of µoverdemandingness¶ higher for collectives than for 
individuDOV"'RHVPRUDOLW\OHJLWLPDWHO\LQIULQJHPRUHXSRQJURXSV¶SXUVXLWRIWKHLUHQGVWKDQRQ
LQGLYLGXDOV¶SXUVXLWRIWKHLUV",QWHUHVWLQJO\WKHUHLVJRRGUHDVRQWRWKLQNOHVVPD\EHGHPDQGHG
of groups than individuals and good reason to think more may be. In order to defend our parity 
claim, we need to defuse each possible disanalogy. 
First, there is reason to think less may be demanded of groups than individuals. This 
reason is that collectives are created for the specific purpose of pursuing certain ends. These are 
its µconstitutive ends¶: ends that are deeply important to the collective and serve to underpin 
PDQ\RIWKHFROOHFWLYH¶VPRUHVSHFLILFHQGVDQGSODQV7KLVVXJJHVWVLW¶VRYHUGHPDQGLQJIRUWKHP
to do much to sacrifice those ends. Thus, even if all kinds of obligations apply to groups, each 
obligation applies with less demandingness when it applies to groups. Corporations and churches 
might be the clearest examples here: while there is a pro tanto moral demand for corporations 
and churches to have environmentally friendly practices, we tend to think this obligation is 
overridden if it is incompatible with the full pursuit of their (permissible) constitutive ends. Thus, 
it seems an oil company cannot have an obligation to stop searching for oil and pursue green 
energy instead²even if the company is perfectly able to pursue green energy, and would cause 
harm if it searches for oil, has caused rectification-requiring harm through oil drilling, is able to 
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help others through pursuing green energy, and so on. The oil company cannot have an 
obligation to pursue green energy, one might think, simply because this is not its UDLVRQG¶rWUH. In 
WKH,QWURGXFWLRQZHVDZWKDW6LQJHUKROGVDVLPLODUYLHZDERXWDUWJDOOHULHV¶REOLJDWLRQVWRJLYH
to poverty relief. The same looks true for churches: any obligation churches have to, say, 
alleviate global warming had better be consistent with the ardent pursuit of their aims of 
worshipping, proselytising, and so on. Anything else is too demanding. 
Second, though, there is reason to think more can be demanded of groups than 
LQGLYLGXDOV 7KLV UHDVRQ LV WKDW JURXSV GR QRW KDYH SKHQRPHQDO H[SHULHQFH 7KH\ GRQ¶W feel 
demands in the way individuals do. Imagine for a moment that the oil company has a duty to 
pursue green energy. If this requires the company to wholly revise its constitutive ends, we 
would not regret the effects on its conscious experience and unique subjective feel of the world, 
because it does not have these things. It would not feel despair or loss. The group would not²in 
an experiential, phenomenal sense²even be aware it was revising its ends (though obviously it 
would believe this in the functional sense outlined in §I). This suggests we can ask more of 
FROOHFWLYHVWKDQLQGLYLGXDOVVLQFHWKH\GRQ¶WUHDOO\IHHOWKe demands anyway. 
The upshot is this. The overdemandingness threshold for any given agent will vary with: 
(i) whether the demand conflicts with the DJHQW¶V(permissible) constitutive ends, and (ii) whether 
WKHDJHQWFDQIHHOWKHGHPDQG+RZHYHUZHGRQ¶WWKLQNWKHUH¶VDQ\HQWDLOPHQWEHWZHHQKDYLQJ
one of these properties and being a group.  
7DNH FRQVWLWXWLYH HQGV :KLOH LW¶V WUXH WKDW ZHOO-functioning groups have constitutive 
HQGV LW¶V DOVR WUXH WKDW ZHOO-functioning humans have constitutive ends. An indivLGXDO¶V
constitutive ends might include being an excellent teacher and researcher, being a dedicated 
parent, maintaining life-long friendships, or seeking new cultural experiences. It is typically 
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thought that morality may not thwart such ends (Cullity 2004). Some individuals do not have any 
constitutive ends, but then some groups are also in the midst of identity crises and so lack 
constitutive ends. Well-functioning agents²whether individuals or groups²have constitutive 
ends that morality cannot override. 7KHUH¶VQRGLVDQDORJ\KHUH 
It might seem that individuals have more control over the content of their constitutive 
ends than collectives have over the content of theirs. If so, then perhaps morality can require 
individuals to choose particular constitutive ends rather than others, whereas it cannot require 
this of collectives. If so, then morality would be more demanding on individuals than on 
collectives: a disanalogy.9 We resist this on two fronts. First, individuals have less choice over 
their constitutive ends than liberal visions of the self suggest. Even in diverse and socially liberal 
VRFLHWLHVPDQ\IRUFHVRWKHUWKDQDXWRQRPRXVFKRLFHDFFRXQWIRUVKLIWVLQSHRSOH¶VSHUVRQDOLWLHV
attitudes, and self-conceptions,10 not to mention that these commonly EHFRPHµORFNHG LQ¶RYHU
WLPH DOO RI ZKLFK SODXVLEO\ OLPLW RQH¶V DELOLW\ WR JHQXLQHO\ FKRRVH RQH¶V FRQVWLWXWLYH HQGV
Second, many collectives are able to change their constitutive ends. Consider firms that decide to 
branch out into, and then solely focus on, new products, or decide to take the µgreen bottom line¶ 
seriously. Or consider how states can shift from central planning to free marketism. These are 
JHQXLQHFKRLFHVRIWKHFROOHFWLYHLWVHOIMXVWDVORQJDVWKH\¶UHPDGHYLDWKHFROOHFWLYH¶VGLVWLQFW
internal decision-making procedure.11 6R WKHUH LV QRW VXIILFLHQWGLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ FROOHFWLYHV¶
DQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶IUHHGRPWRGHWHUPLQHFRQVWLWXWLYHHQGVWRPDNHIRUGLVSDULW\LQREOLJDWLRQV 
                                                 
9
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
10
 For psychological research on this, see Heatherton and Weinberger (eds.) 1994; Crano and Pislin 2010; Sherman 
and Cohen 2006. 
11
  On the reality and irreducibility of collective freedom, see Hindriks 2008; Hess 2014. 
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What about feeling demands? Again, poorly-functioning individuals may lack the 
relevant affective response to demands that undermine their constitutive ends. And, again, well-
functioning groups have constituent parts²members²that would feel despair or loss upon the 
dissolution of the group or the undermining of its constitutive ends. (Imagine how deeply 
disaffected many people would feel if their football team changed its fundamental aims, let alone 
their church or state.) So while constitutive ends and phenomenology may well make a 
difference to demandingness, they do not drive a wedge between individuals and groups. 
 
III.B. Secondariness 
The second strength-related problem arises from double counting: for every obligation, there is 
WKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWJURXSPHPEHUVZLOOEHµKLWWZLFH¶E\WKDWREOLJDWLRQ7KLVZLOOKDSSHn if both 
the individual and a group of which she is a member bear the obligation. Suppose, for example, 
that for me the assistance obligation triggers a duty to give money to charity. Suppose I fully 
discharge that duty. But then my state or my church has a duty to give international aid as a result 
of the fact that it, too, has the obligation (because it has the capacity to meet the need). And 
suppose that, in discharging its obligation, my group must pass at least some costs to me 
(through tithing or taxation). As a result, I have now been hit twice by assistance obligations. 
The objection, then, is this. In order to avoid double-FRXQWLQJZHPXVWKROGWKDWJURXSV¶
obligations are secondary WR LQGLYLGXDOV¶ REOLJDWLRQV 7R VHH WKH VHFRQGDULQHVV VXSSRVH DOl 
members have done everything they individually should, up to the limit of what can be 
reasonably demanded of them, and there are no costs that can get absorbed entirely at the group 
level. In this case, the group cannot be reasonably demanded to discharge the obligation. All the 
shares or parts of its obligation are excluded as distributable to members, because members are 
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DOUHDG\DWWKHOLPLWVRIZKDWFDQEHGHPDQGHGRIWKHP6RJURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQVFDQEHSUHFOXGHG
by individuals having fully discharged their individual obligations, when doing so takes them up 
to their limit of GHPDQGLQJQHVV,QWKLVZD\JURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQVPLJKWEHVHFRQGDU\WR²because 
conditional upon facts about²the discharging of duties that members have as individuals 
considered indHSHQGHQWO\ RI WKH JURXS %XW LI JURXSV¶ REOLJDWLRQV DUH VHFRQGDU\ WR WKH
obligations of their members, then there is not parity between the two. So our parity claim is 
wrong. 
An initial reply to this objection is to simply accept double-counting. Perhaps being a 
member of a group entails that more costs can be imposed upon me when my group has a duty, 
HYHQLI,¶YHDOUHDG\IXOO\GLVFKDUJHGP\LQGLYLGXDOREOLJDWLRQV3HUKDSVWKLVLVEHFDXVHWKHJURXS
FDQ GR PXFK PRUH WKDQ PH RQ P\ RZQ7R PDNH RXU RSSRQHQW¶V view as strong as possible, 
though, OHW¶VDVVXPHLW¶VLPSHUPLVVLEOHIRUWKHJURXSWRGLVWULEXWHDQ\FRVWVWRPHLI,¶YHKLWP\
demandingness threshold. 
7KHFRUUHFWUHSO\LVWRGHQ\WKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶REOLJDWLRQVDOZD\VWDNHSULRULW\,QWKLVZD\
we deny thDWJURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQVDUHLQKHUHQWO\VHFRQGDU\$QLQGLYLGXDOZLOOKDYHREOLJDWLRQVDV
an individual, and obligations in virtue of her membership in the various collectives to which she 
belongs. Sometimes it will not be possible for her to fulfil all obligations without exceeding her 
demandingness threshold %XW WKDW GRHVQ¶W WHOO XV ZKLFK VKH VKRXOG SULRULWL]H ,W VHHPV UDWKHU
REYLRXVWKDWZKDWVKHVKRXOGSULRULWL]HGHSHQGVRQWKHFDVH6RPHWLPHVFROOHFWLYHV¶REOLJDWLRQV
will be extremely important, i.e., their fulfilment (or not) will involve very high stakes. In such 
cases, members should surely prioritize their member-distributed obligations over less important 
individual obligations (such as keeping a promise to meet a friend for lunch). Sometimes the 
reverse will be true. If and when it happens that all members are in this position, the collective 
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made of those members will not have an obligation (or it will have the obligation, but be excused 
from non-performance on grounds of over-demandingness). Likewise, individuals will be 
excused from the non-fulfilment of their qua-individual obligations when the discharging of their 
qua-member obligations took them up to the relevant threshold on demandingness. It works both 
ways. There is no systematic relegation of either obligation, and so no disparity. 
 
§IV. Conclusion 
Everyday thought and talk is rife with claims about the obligations of group agents. In this paper, 
ZHKDYHDLPHGWRYLQGLFDWHWKLVWDONDVRQDSDUZLWKFODLPVDERXWLQGLYLGXDOV¶REOLJDWLRQVWe 
sought to understand the range of obligations that groups are subject to, and the all-things-
considered demands that those obligations can place on groups. We have argued that collectives 
FDQEHDUVL[VWDQGDUGNLQGVRIREOLJDWLRQ:HKDYHQ¶W\HWHVWDEOLVKHG WKHµDQG WKDW¶VDOO¶FODLP
LHZHKDYHQ¶WVKRZQWKDWWKHVHDUHWKHonly obligations collectives have. If they are subject to 
further kinds of obligation, which individuals are not subject to, then that would be a further 
argument for disparity, against our conclusion here. We are unsure what these collective-only 
obligations could be, so we leave that as an interesting open question. For  each of the six kinds 
of obligation that we commented on, we suggested that seeming differences between individuDOV¶
DQGJURXSV¶REOLJDWLRQVDUHDFWXDOO\WUDFNLQJVRPHRWKHUGLVWLQFWLRQRUDUHQRWUHDOGLIIHUHQFHV
or are contingent and quantitative differences rather than necessary and qualitative differences. 
This leaves us with a clearer and fuller picture of the moral and political demands that can be 
imposed upon group agents. 
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